Posterous theme by Cory Watilo

Filed under: VC

The Next 10 Years Will Be Great For Both Founders And VCs via @techcrunch

TechCrunch ran an excellent post from a VC that is optimistic about the future.  William Quigley makes excellent points and I agree we have reached a tipping point...

 

Editor’s note: this is a guest post from venture capitalist William Quigley, managing director at Clearstone Venture Partners.

Earlier this week I issued a report about the positive changes that have recently taken place in the venture capital industry. These changes are profound and will have a lasting effect on both the venture capital asset class as well as today’s start-ups.

Much has been written about the so-called “golden age” of venture capital in the late 1990s dot-com era, when the likes of Netscape, Yahoo, Amazon and eBay were created.

Yes, those certainly were great times for founders and early stage investors, but I will let you in on a little secret: for all of the brilliance, ambition and hard work that went into building these iconic companies, the vast majority of the capital appreciation in these businesses took place only after they went public.

To put it another way, the rewards for building a truly great business – say, the world’s biggest etailer or the largest online auction site – accrued mainly to the public shareholders. That’s right. The ones who went through all the hard work of logging into their E*Trade accounts and clicking the “Buy” button. They participated in over 99% (literally) of the value created from these brilliant entrepreneurs and their wonderful companies.

Now understand, I don’t begrudge the public investors, but as either a founder, early stage company employee or investor (angel or VC), why bother taking all of the early stage risk when you could have earned far more just buying shares of your company once it went public?

Let’s also keep in mind that public companies are generally a lot less risky than private ones. Less work and lower risk. That is how it used to be for public shareholders, but that era has ended for good. Let me give you some perspective on how much things have changed since the last tech cycle.

Amazon.com, the world’s largest Internet retailer, went public at a $440 million valuation. Hard to believe, isn’t it? A company worth $90 billion today was worth just over $400 million when it went public in 1997. That skimpy valuation represented less than one times its forward 12 months of revenues, a multiple more closely associated with a corrugated cardboard manufacturer than the most important innovator in retailing in the past 100 years.

eBay went public at a $650 million valuation, representing less than three times its forward revenues. Amazingly, this valuation was considered adequate even though at the time of its IPO, eBay had already established itself as the pre-eminent auction site on the web. Go back to the earlier part of the 1990s, and it gets even more extreme. Cisco, the most important company in computer networking infrastructure, went public at $225 million, a valuation representing just over one time its annual revenues.

Remember, this was supposed to be a time when venture capital and entrepreneurship was highly rewarded. It turns out, until very recently, public investors, those who waited until the hard work was done and the upside was evident, were the ones who earned the greatest returns. Nice work if you can find it.

We have now entered a new era, a marvelous era, in fact, for those brave enough to start a company and bold enough to build a global business. This new era, what I call the “real golden age” for company builders and private investors, allows for enormous value creation before a company even goes public.

Google was the catalyst for this change. When it went public in 2004 at a $40 billion market cap, many thought the Internet bubble had returned. Something had changed, but it wasn’t a new bubble mindset. It was the understanding that some companies were now able to create value far faster than was possible before. Those investors who thought Google was overvalued at $40 billion soon learned that, in fact, it was dramatically undervalued. In 2010, Google earned nearly $19 billion in gross profit and almost $12 billion in operating profit!

Of course, if investors had known that when Google went public, they would gladly have bought the shares at the $40 billion valuation. Then again, some investors gladly did. So what happened in the span of six or seven years that caused public investors to go from valuing Amazon or eBay at a few hundred million dollars to valuing Google at $40 billion? I believe three permanent changes occurred during that time period that allowed heretofore unprecedented valuations to take hold.

First, the proliferation of Internet access. When my partners and I launched our consumer Internet fund – idealab Capital Partners – in 1997, we already thought of the Internet as a mainstream phenomenon. How wrong we were. Consider that, even by the year 2000, only one-third of the U.S. population had Internet access. Today, nearly every US household has Internet access, many with a high-speed broadband connection. The growth rate in China makes the U.S. figure look downright sluggish. China has gone from about 20 million Internet users in 2000 to close to 500 million today.

These extraordinary growth rates in Internet adoption were not fully reflected in company valuations in the last tech cycle. Now they are, and investors are giving businesses like Facebook,Zynga and others the benefit of the doubt that they will capitalize on the value created by far higher global Internet penetration rates.

Second, the rise of the hedge funds. Since 2000, the number of hedge funds have doubled and the assets they manage have nearly tripled to $2 trillion. Why is this important? Because hedge funds often specialize in particular asset classes, like technology stocks, and with that specialization comes superior knowledge and a greater insight into the potential terminal value a company can achieve. This was not the case in the 1980s and 1990s, when many of the iconic technology start-ups were born.

Microsoft went public in 1986. Keep in mind this was 11 years after its founding, by the way, for those who think the present eight-year standard for going public is too long It was offered to the public at a $640 million valuation, or about three times its annual revenues. Yet, at the time of its IPO, Microsoft’s Windows was already the world’s dominant operating system. However, there were few technology-focused mutual funds, which were then the primary buyers of tech IPOs.

And so, very few investors appreciated the speed and scale at which Microsoft could grow. Accordingly, the company was valued modestly by its investment bankers and nearly all of the gargantuan value of the Microsoft franchise was made available to the public shareholders. Think that Facebook ‘s public shareholders will have the same luxury?

The investors who bought Microsoft shares at its IPO and held onto it for the same amount of time it was a private company – 11 years – were treated to several hundred billion dollars of capital appreciation, not the $650 million that Bill Gates, Paul Allen and the other early employees earned for their 11 years of grueling start-up work. Compare the Microsoft, Cisco, Amazon or eBay examples to what we see in the post-Google era.

VMWare went public in 2006 at a $12 billion valuation. It quickly rose to a $30 billion market capitalization. Thus, the existing investors (parent company EMC in this case) captured over one third of the company’s likely terminal value. Google’s founders, pre-IPO employees and early investors also did quite well, capturing a respectable 25% of the companies likely terminal value. And what of those earlier tech giants – Microsoft, Cisco, Amazon and eBay? The founders and early investors of these extraordinary businesses captured less than 1% of the terminal values of their businesses while they were still private.

The valuations of today’s private tech leaders – Facebook, Zynga, Groupon and possibly Twitter – are such that I believe upwards of 50-75% of the terminal values of these companies will be captured by the folks who did the real work and took the real risks, those who quit their jobs and begged, borrowed and cajoled friends, families and angel investors to take a chance on their far-fetched idea.

Here is the important, and game-changing, point: in order to participate in the great wealth creation taking place in this and future technology cycles, you will have to be a founder, an early employee or a private investor. The so-called easy money will be earned before a company goes public. This is a radical shift from earlier technology cycles.

The third factor contributing to the far high valuations accruing to private companies today is the speed at which companies can now exploit the global marketplace. When I was at idealab in the 1990s, none of our start-ups attempted to address international markets in the first few years of their existence. In fact, for many of those companies, international markets didn’t become a serious focus until after they went public. How times have changed.

Today it is possible to pursue an international growth strategy almost as quickly as a domestic one. The cost of running a global business has dramatically shrunk, and while costs of going overseas have plummeted, the revenue opportunities have increased manifold.

Just consider where three of the largest economies were 10 years ago, and where they are today. India was a $500 billion economy in 2000. Today it is a $1.4 trillion one. Brazil was a $600 billion economy ten years ago, compared to $2 trillion in 2010. The growth of China’s economy in the last decade is breathtaking, from $1.2 trillion to $5.7 trillion in just 10 years. Combined, these three economies have added $6.8 trillion to world GDP since 2000.

Public investors are aware of these economic figures, and they are rewarding companies addressing the global marketplace sooner in their lifecycle. Groupon has taken note. It is just four years old and already operates in 35 countries. Given its international ambitions, it is likely that within two years Groupon will have upwards of 20,000 employees outside of the U.S. A potential $25 billion IPO valuation awaits it for going global faster than its peers.

What makes the change I have just described so fascinating is that so many of the traditional limited partners to venture capital funds have withdrawn from the asset class in the last few years, understandable perhaps after 10 years of poor returns. But just as the game has shifted to rewarding private investors over public shareholders like never before, limited partners have decided to look elsewhere for exceptional returns.

I believe that is a mistake.

Going forward, those who participate in building new companies and providing the start-up capital to fuel the growth of those businesses, will be handsomely rewarded like never before.

Investment into the Digital Advertising space is heating up

Venture capital and M&A activity is heating up in the digital advertising space.  Money is flowing in at a faster pace than last year... by far.  Here are some relevant stats from January 2011:
  • There were 196 marketing / digital commerce deals in January totaling $8.5B 
    • (This compares to 70 deals and $3.3B a year earlier)  
  • 82 of the deals were growth / investment capital with the balance being M&A
  • Digital advertising (which includes ad networks, exchanges and online lead generation) was the most active subset with 18 deals totaling $316M  in investment capital 
  • The average investment (excluding Adknowledge) was $6.8M
  • The weighted average multiples are amazing... 2.7X revenue and 13.3X EDITDA

I see a good deal of consolidation and money flowing in to expand the "white space" below Google, Yahoo! and Bing.  Adknowledge is a great example, now the number 4 digital advertising network.  After doubling revenue to $300M in 2010, Adknowledge is using the funding for acquisitions.  They have a narrow focus, putting advertisers together with sites considered the "remainder of the internet".

This is a bigger market than people might think.  The investment into this space shows that the growth and consolodation opportunity is significant.  If you are in this space, now is the time to move.  The tipping point has arrived.  I would be interested in your perspective, feel free to post a comment or contact me with your thoughts.

Tom Cuthbert

 

The man behind the money behind Facebook, Groupon and Zynga

Facebook's friend in Russia

Posted by Jessi Hempel, writer @Fortune

DST's Yuri Milner makes big bets on social media companies and brings new clout -- along with a mysterious oligarch backer -- to Silicon Valley.

Yuri Milner has 50 friends on Facebook. Mark Zuckerberg is one of them. They met a couple of years ago when Zuckerberg, the Facebook founder and CEO, was trying to learn more about a Russian social network that Milner partly owned. Then, in the spring of 2009, Zuckerberg sold Milner 2% of Facebook for $200 million.

At the time, more than one Silicon Valley insider wrote the investment off as dumb money. Zuckerberg knew better. Milner and his partner, Gregory Finger, had built Digital Sky Technologies from a small Russian investment venture to a holding company that controlled the businesses behind 75% of the pages served on the Russian-speaking web. And because the online-advertising market is far less robust in Russia than in the U.S., DST's companies had already found ways to make money that U.S. companies hadn't tried. "I talked to a bunch of different [venture] firms and I spent time with [Milner] and I was like, this guy is clearly smarter and more insightful and has more experience in what we are doing," Zuckerberg tells Fortune. It helped that Milner, 48, offered great deal terms: His investment valued Facebook at $10 billion, an eyebrow-raising amount at the time, and he didn't ask for a board seat or any other special privileges.

Read more >>>

For startups, there's more than just hits and misses

For startups, there's more than just hits and misses

By Fred Wilson, contributor FORTUNE
(Fred Wilson has been a venture capitalist since 1996, and currently serves as managing partner of Union Square Ventures. He blogs regularly at AVC.)

There are a lot of "falsisms" being bandied about in startup land these days. And one that really bothers me is the idea that returns on startup investing are "bimodal."

For those who don't speak geek, bimodal means there are one of two possible outcomes. And in this case, those two outcomes are a total bust or a huge, Google-style win.

If you buy into that logic, then you want to be in every deal because if you are going to take a massive number of hits, you need to absolutely be in that Google-style win or you are toast.

But startup returns are not bimodal. They exhibit more of a power law curve. There certainly will be one or two venture deals every year that generate 100x or more. And there certainly will be quite a few total busts. But there are a lot of outcomes in the middle of those two. And you can make a great return investing in startups without being in the 100x deal.

Here is the distribution of current returns in our 2004 fund. To be confidential, I am not listing company names and have "fudged" the top returning deal number so nobody plays a guessing game with that one.

A couple things about these returns. First, many of these returns are unrealized and carried at valuations forced upon us by our auditors under the auspices of "FAS 157." If we were working under a different accounting paradigm, we would be carrying many of these investments at much lower values. Second, this fund is only six years old. And so we are still carrying one third of our portfolio at cost. When this fund is fully realized, I am pretty sure there won't be a single investment that is worth exactly its cost.

So don't get too caught up in the total numbers here. The point is that startup returns are not bimodal in any way. They exhibit a power law curve. And you can make great returns playing in the middle of the curve.

I've spent my entire career playing the middle ground of this curve. With the exception of Geocities, which my partner Jerry led at Flatiron, I have never seen a 100x return. I suspect our first Union Square Ventures fund will change that. But from 1990 to 2005, a span of fifteen years, I built an excellent personal track record that helped me and Brad raise our first fund working exclusively in the middle of the return distribution curve.

And the way you do it is you keep your "busts" to less than a third of all of your deals and make sure you don't put a ton of capital into a bad investment. And you work the middle third to make sure you make a decent return on them. And you follow on aggressively in your winners. You do that and you can post gross returns in the range of 50% annual returns gross before fees and carry.

The thing you most want to avoid is "doing every deal". You need to select good deals and avoid bad ones. That's what bothers me most about this "bimodal" argument. It suggests that you need to be in every deal so you can catch the one big winner. That's a bad strategy for everyone but the one person who can actually get into every deal. Because there is a good chance that you can't get into every deal. And there is also a good chance that the one deal you can't get into is the one that is going to be the home run.

So pick your deals carefully. Accept that you may not get into the next Google. Work the middle part of the return distribution curve. Recognize your bad decisions quickly. Work your deals hard. And follow your winners. And you'll do just fine.


Dear Entrepreneur: Think Cash, Not Ideas

Timely advice from HBR contributor Anthony Tjan.  It's pretty easy to get lost in an idea and forget to focus on the basics of business.  I was told once that "cash is king"... true then, true now.


Dear Entrepreneur: Think Cash, Not Ideas


Last week NBA legend-turned-entrepreneur Magic Johnson sold his Starbucks franchises back to the corporation for a reported $75 million. Rumor has it, he's freeing up some cash to invest in a professional sports team (he also sold his stake in the Los Angeles Lakers basketball team).


About 12 years ago, Magic Johnson formed a joint venture franchise program with Starbucks (Urban Coffee Opportunities) to open coffee shops in developing urban areas such as Harlem. The goal was to reinvigorate under served neighborhoods with jobs. It was a a successful partnership. Under the Urban Coffee Opportunities, more than 100 Starbucks operate in under served urban neighborhoods across the country, including Atlanta, Chicago, Detroit ,Los Angeles, New York and Washington, D.C.

Starbucks' purchase of Magic's 50 percent share of the joint venture is an important endorsement of the power behind small businesses with real cash flow models. It's also a counter-intuitive lesson to leaders about how good businesses and good partnerships can work in under served areas. Doing things where others don't — or won't — inspires me and my colleagues in our daily work.


Our venture firm, Cue Ball, considers franchise opportunities. We're selective, but we like the simplicity of their business models. The attractiveness of most retailing and restaurant franchise opportunities comes down to the unit economics: how much money is required to open a unit, and how long will it take to get the payback? If the concept is good, there should be a healthy on-going cash flow stream. Let's say you build a Starbucks for X dollars. The profits pay back that money in Y years, and you calculate the on-going cash flow minus requirements for ongoing maintenance and improvement. This can quickly give you a "back of the envelope" sense of how much money you can make, and you can quickly assess a concept's economic potential.

In the "sophisticated" business circles of MBAs, tech entrepreneurs, and private investors franchise restaurants, retail and other consumer service startups produce a negative, knee jerk reaction. The cocktail conversation dismissal of these investments usually starts with the assertion that the vast majority of restaurants fail, and that such concepts require a lot of capital and time. Plus, they're not Big Ideas. They're not cool.


It's true that most restaurants fail. Then again, most technology start-ups fail, too. And yes, you need capital and time to get them going. Of course, biotech companies spend a decade and billions of dollars just to bring a single idea to market. Still, tech investors will argue, in the "capital efficient" VC world we live in today, you can start and test the viability of digital media and social networking enterprises with very little capital before committing larger follow-on investments. But do they know that most restaurant and retail concepts have long used a similar stage-gating pattern for investing? To see if a restaurant chain concept can work, you start with one, and if you have unit economic success in that first unit, you replicate or improve on that success with subsequent units. At that point, risks have been significantly mitigated and there is an argument to be made that the subsequent capital required has relatively low risk relative to the return potential. Indeed, once the first few Starbucks in under served neighborhoods demonstrated success, the opportunity to repeat a cash-generating concept was quite high. Compare that to, say, a social media startup where risks persist and are constant as tech is a much more volatile and changing business than coffee service.


So why are tech and pharma and other sexy ideas VC darlings while coffee shops aren't?


It is easy to get lost in the excitement of starting or investing in innovative start-ups and focus on big ideas and big markets, all the while forgetting that the most important business criterion besides the team is a cash flow model that works. The real focus in any investment should be on risk-adjusted returns and not on what investors consider cool. From an investing perspective, people and business models should always trump the idea and market. The "little guys" who have the simple idea but real cash flow models may have as much of a chance to create value as the "big thinking guys" who have the big idea without the cash flow model.

Magic Johnson knew this. In 10 seasons with the Lakers, estimates put his earnings (not including endorsements) at about $18M. Let's round that up to $20M, or even $25M.


Over roughly the same number of years after his NBA career, Johnson's Starbucks venture earned him more than three times that amount. Not bad for the kind of investment many VCs would dismiss before even finishing their cocktail.


Anthony Tjan is CEO, Managing Partner and Founder of the venture capital firm Cue Ball. An entrepreneur, investor, and senior advisor, Tjan has become a recognized business builder.


Anthony Tjan